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Abstract: Many concerns related to women in combat roles stem
from two related assumption: (a) the existing structure and culture
of the armed forces are well adapted to the requirements of combat; and (b) politically imposed change is harmful to the professionalism and effectiveness of the military. These can be dangerous
assumptions. Instead, the traditional “truths” about the nature of
unit cohesion and the optimal capabilities of individual soldiers and
officers need to be periodically examined. Doing so can maximize
the effectiveness of military organizations in a changing environment.

T

he response to former Defense Secretary Panetta’s recent decision to eliminate the ground combat exclusion rule for women
in the US military obviously differs widely within the armed
forces, from service to service, unit to unit, and individual to individual.
However, with the risk of painting with a broad brush, there is clear
apprehension about the consequences of this decision.1 Notable scholars
like Martin van Creveld have provided fierce opposition, arguing that
women in the military—not just in combat roles—is “part symptom,
part cause, of the decline of the ‘advanced’ military.”2
The concerns come in numerous shapes and forms, from practical and administrative issues regarding latrines, housing, and maternity
leave, to the more serious concerns about the impact on the combat
effectiveness of units. What will the inclusion of women in combat roles
mean for the armed forces, and especially the organization’s “fighting
power”—its effectiveness in the field of operations? After all, the main
purpose of military organizations is to defend the constitution either as
a deterrent force or by fighting and winning the nation’s wars.
This article challenges two common concerns related to the impact
of women on combat effectiveness: (1) the idea that women, in general,
are not fit for war; that their often lower physical abilities and/or supposed lack of mental toughness put at risk the combat effectiveness
of the units; (2) the inclusion of women and gender perspectives will
change the organization’s combat culture to reflect a civilian rather than
a military ethos.
While these fears are understandable, they are based on a flawed
assumption and are misguided. Their key assumption is that the existing
military structure and culture are already well adapted to perform with
1     Dan Lamothe, “Two more female Marines flunk infantry officers training,” Marine Corps
Times, April 2, 2013, http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20130402/NEWS/304020020;
a typical critique is provided by R. Cort Kirkwood, “Women in Combat: War for and Against
Women” The New American, April 12, 2013, http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/
item/15012-women-in-combat-war-for-and-against-women.
2     Martin van Creveld, “To wreck a military,” Small Wars Journal, January 28, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/to-wreck-a-military; Martin van Creveld, “The Great Illusion: Women in
the Military,” Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000): 429-442;
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excellence in war; that the military organization looks like it does because
of the objective requirements of warfare, or what Samuel Huntington
has referred to as the functional imperative of the armed forces.3 Any
changes—especially politically imposed changes like women in combat
or the repeal of “don’t ask don’t tell”—therefore pose a danger to what
is perceived as a functioning system.
Due to this assumption, including women in direct combat roles
becomes a necessary evil: how can it be limited to avoid damage to
the existing order. Even supporters of women in combat and gender
perspectives ask how this can be achieved with as little damage to the
organization as possible. Women who have served with combat units
in the field proudly speak of the moment they were accepted as “one
of the boys.” Commanders and soldiers who have served with or under
women highlight that it is not a big deal and that it really does not change
anything as long as they are competent. Integrating women with the aim
of minimizing damage to the existing structure and culture of the organization provides a negative starting point for these processes. Instead,
the introduction of women in combat units—or the implementation of
a gendered perspective in military organizations—should be seen as an
opportunity to revise the culture and structure of the armed forces for
increased effectiveness in contemporary warfare. It should, therefore,
be accomplished with the aim of maximizing the effectiveness of what
the organization is supposed to be good at—using force, or the threat
of force—for security, stability, or plain victory.

The Case of the Marine Corps’ Infantry Officer Course

Since the decision to lift the ban on women in direct ground combat
units, much media attention has been directed at the Marine Corps
Infantry Officer Course at Quantico. This gruesome training regimen
has seen four women enter and none come close to finishing. Though
its students tend to be top performers in basic officer training, more
than one in five candidates are dropped during the infantry course.
Interestingly, this 13-week course, considered among the toughest in the
US military, is also described as “part of the Pentagon’s ongoing effort
to determine which additional jobs in combat units should be opened to
women.”4 Indeed, the Marine Corps began recruiting female volunteers
for this course in 2012 as part of a broader effort to assess how female
Marines might perform in assignments whose primary mission is ground
combat.5 This means the Infantry Officer Course is seen as a viable test
or indicator of the suitability of women in combat roles.
The greatest concern at Quantico appears to be the risk of lowering physical standards to accommodate women. The commander of the
Infantry Officer School and the Basic Officer Course has categorically
stated this will never happen. “They [the standards] are gender-neutral
now. . . . They aren’t hard to be hard. These are the things they need to
3     Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 2.
4     Lamothe, “Two more female Marines.”
5     James Dao, “Women (and Men) Face Big Hurdles in Training for Marine Infantry Units,” The
New York Times, March 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/30/us/marines-test-womenfor-infantry-roles.html?pagewanted=all
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be able to do to be infantry officers.”6 Clearly, the working assumption
of military leadership is that existing physical standards are appropriate. Correspondingly, there is a distinct belief that the Infantry Officer
Course, including the timed obstacle course of the first day that eliminated three of the four women, is a fairly accurate reflection of the
physical requirements of infantry combat. Thus, if the course, or the
physical standards it serves to test, is altered, it will presumably have a
direct impact on combat effectiveness.
A Marine Corps major has argued that “[w]hile certain things that
occur at Infantry Officer Course replicate combat, the worst days of
infantry combat are much, much worse.”7 While this statement was
clearly made in support of the nature of the course, it unwittingly also
challenged it by raising the question why the standards, and the contents of the infantry course, are not raised to reflect the worst days of
infantry combat. The simple answer is, of course, that there are always
compromises involved. Raising entry standards, or making the course
tougher, will lead to lower recruit numbers, increased risks of injury
during training, and perhaps the need to lower other standards such
as education, analytical capability, and problem solving. In the end,
the major’s statement highlighted the fact that an obstacle course, or
an entire training program, can never replicate the exact demands of
combat and leadership in the field. Instead, these standards will always
be based on a combination of lessons learned, tradition, organizational
culture, and the availability of candidates. Indeed, how did we arrive at
the current physical and mental standards and the contents of training
courses? How long has it been since these were revised and updated
based on objective assessments of combat effectiveness in the field?
This raises the question of why the physical standards are treated
as sacrosanct. Other standards were lowered in 2005-06 to meet the
Army’s recruitment goals, and while it was certainly discussed, the
level of resistance was limited compared to lowered physical standards.
Two standards changed at that time were the elimination of the high
school graduation requirement and acceptance of lower aptitude scores.8
However, given the complexity of contemporary warfare, the notions
of “three-block warfare,” and broad skillsets, as well as the importance
of the “strategic corporal,” this reduction was remarkable. Why would
these changes be acceptable if lowered physical standards are not? What
do combat after-action reports highlight as the main problems in failed
or successful combat situations in Iraq and Afghanistan? We need a
clearer and more objective understanding of whether it is physical or
cognitive capabilities that make a difference in combat.
British Lieutenant General Sir Robert Fry, then Deputy Commander
of Multi-National Force – Iraq, argued that one of the greatest problems
in Iraq was the failure to translate tactical behavior into operational
effect in the pursuit of strategic goals.9 Despite what seemed to be a
number of tactical victories, the intended effects at higher levels were
6     Ibid.
7     Ibid.
8     Elise Cooper, “Women in Combat: the Soldiers Speak,” American Thinker, February 21, 2013,
http://www.americanthinker.com/2013/02/women_in_combat_the_soldiers_speak.html
9     Robert Fry, “Expeditionary Operations in the Modern Era,” RUSI Journal, 150, no. 6
(December 2005), 62.
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missing. Solving these issues has little to do with physical standards or
even combat effectiveness—it is about something much more subtle and
intangible—understanding how certain events and conduct impact the
local situation in a culture very far from home.
It is intellectually convenient to assume that our current standards,
as well as the training and testing methods of our military organizations,
are well adapted to the nature of modern warfare. It is also dangerous,
however, as these assumptions may well be flawed and may seriously
undermine the effectiveness of the organization. Instead, organizations
seeking to perfect their conduct of warfare must constantly reconsider
and adapt their standards. They must also be willing to experiment.
It may indeed be the case that the worst days of combat are worse
than the Infantry Officer Course, or that the standards tested are perfectly adapted to match the requirements of effective leadership in the
field of operations. However, there is also a risk that courses and standards are based on tradition or a conventional idea of what combat is
supposed to look like and how it is effectively conducted. All standards
and training methods need to be questioned as to what extent they
reflect the capabilities needed in the field of operations. In the wake of
the administration’s decision to allow women in combat roles, an objective evaluation of standards risks being tainted with the perception that
they are being reevaluated to lower them for women. It is, therefore, of
utmost importance that evaluations and new standards are truly objective and gender neutral. This will also mean that certain units will, in
practice, be impossible or highly difficult to access for women. Then
again, this exclusion will be based on objective minimum standards
rather than gender bias. To grasp the problems of subjective standards,
we need to take a few steps back and discuss the more fundamental
questions of what military effectiveness is and how it is achieved.

Military Effectiveness and Contemporary Operations

There are two problems with the way military effectiveness is traditionally measured. First, too often military effectiveness is treated as
“fighting power”—or the ability to succeed on the battlefield—and
thereby separated from the larger political purpose of the military
campaign. Second, within the debates about fighting power, traditional
theories about military capability and effectiveness have often overemphasized physical military factors, such as troop numbers and the quality
of equipment, while paying less attention to the more intangible factors
that influence a state’s capacity to use its material resources effectively.
However, cases where the numerically and technologically weak win
battles and campaigns suggest that such explanations of military capability are misleading because they fail to acknowledge the importance of
the policies for which the military instrument is used.10
An effective military organization is one that succeeds in performing the core tasks that the political leadership requests. Traditionally,
or ideally, this has meant fighting and winning conventional wars—
defending the nation. In the contemporary strategic context, and some
10     Risa A. Brooks, “Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed?” International
Security 28, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 149–191; Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in
Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
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would argue this was the case in the past as well, the most common
tasks involve different types of stability operations with the purpose
of establishing conditions from which broader political processes can
take place.11 The connection between military effectiveness and the
intentions of political leaders means we not only need to look at the
tasks most frequently asked of military organizations today, but also the
nature of civil-military relations.
This is not the place to answer the difficult question about the
character of contemporary and future warfare. As already noted, this
article highlights the idea that the most common forms of military
engagement the last few decades, and probably in the foreseeable future,
are different forms of stability operations, peace operations, counterinsurgency, fourth generation, small, irregular, “new,” asymmetric, or
whatever adjective we more or less usefully place in front of the old
substantive “war.” These campaigns take place amongst the people
and involve both substate and suprastate actors in a struggle for legitimacy and far-reaching political changes—democratization, respect for
human rights, and long-term economic development. For the most part,
it involves low-intensity, counterinsurgency operations between regular
armed forces of the West and loosely formed networks of insurgents
employing asymmetric tactics. Contemporary campaigns are drawn-out
processes, often measured in decades rather than in months and years.
They involve a multitude of actors fighting for the hearts and minds of
the local, as well as global, population whose perceptions of the conflict
often determine the outcome.
Importantly, the conduct of contemporary operations entails a much
more complicated and diverse use of the military instrument. This means
that “new,” or at least nontraditional, tasks are asked of military units at
all levels of command. Recruitment and training has not been updated
to reflect the character of contemporary warfare and it is, therefore, time
to discuss not only what success means in contemporary operations,
but also what successful units look like, how they are trained, what unit
culture they possess, and what their cohesion is based on. At the individual level, it is also time to question traditional standards—cognitive
or physical—and examine what soldiers and officers need to succeed on
the “battlefield,” or what is probably better described as the complex
field of deployment. While there is no doubt that certain physical and
cognitive standards will be required for certain military occupational
specialties (MOSs), I suspect this analysis may provide revolutionary
results for the way the armed forces should recruit and train soldiers
and officers. As T. E. Lawrence famously put it, “Irregular Warfare is
far more intellectual than a bayonet charge.”12
The connection between political aims and military effectiveness
means that the field of civil-military relations theory is a useful source
of inspiration. The purpose of this field tends to be normative, to maximize the protective value the armed forces can provide and minimize
the domestic coercive powers those same forces will inevitably possess.
The foundation of most civil-military relations theory is the assumption
that the military institutions of any society are shaped by two forces: a
11     Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane,
2005).
12     T. E. Lawrence, “The Science of Guerrilla Warfare,” in Encyclopaedia Britannica (1923).
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functional imperative stemming from threats to a society’s security and
a societal imperative based on the ideologies, social forces, and institutions dominant within the society.13 The functional imperative is the
character of war and a nation’s geostrategic setting, which by necessity
compels the armed forces to develop a certain structure and professional
culture to be effective. Huntington argued that if the armed forces
reflect only social values and societal culture, it is likely to be incapable
of performing its military function. On the other hand, if it is shaped
only by functional imperatives, it could become impossible to contain
within the society it is supposed to protect.14
The emphasis that theorists place on the issues of military effectiveness and democratic control differs greatly. One source of the divergence
is a “zero-sum” view of the civil-military problem by thinking it is only
possible to maximize either military strength or civilian control.15 An
obvious example is provided by John Hillen while writing about the
cultural gap between civilians and the military:
If the purpose of having a military establishment in the first place is to
promote cozy civil-military relations, then military culture should be forcibly
brought into line with civilian culture. If, however, the purpose of having
a military is to provide for the common defense, then the military must
nurture the unique culture developed for that purpose.16

Equally, Huntington wrote in The Soldier and the State that to increase
the professionalism and effectiveness of the US military, even American
civil society had to adapt to the functional imperative of the armed
forces and the more conservative and military values of West Point,
which he describes as the military ideal at its best—“a bit of Sparta in
the midst of Babylon.”17
However, the very foundation of democratic societies lies in the
notion that political and military leaderships are not equals. On the
other side of the aisle are theorists who emphasize democratic civilian
control more than military effectiveness—the societal imperative takes
precedence.18 Christopher Dandeker warns “those of a liberal persuasion
tend to expect the armed services to conform to civilian values and, in
so doing, underestimate the unique character and demands of military
life”.19 Dandeker, therefore, advocates a pragmatic approach that falls
midway between the two extremes:
The challenge for civilian political and military leaders is to ensure that
a balance is struck between these, sometimes competing, imperatives.
Furthermore, in adjusting to changes in society and international security,
they have to take into account the history and traditions of the individual
13     Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 2.
14     Ibid.
15     Christopher Dandeker, “Military and Society: The Problem, Challenges and Possible
Answers,” in Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance, eds. A. Bryden and P. Fluri
(Baden Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003).
16     John Hillen, “Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?,” in America the Vulnerable: Our Military
Problems and How To Fix Them, eds. John Lehman and Harvey Sicherman (Philadelphia: Foreign
Policy Research Institute, 2002), 168–169.
17     Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 466.
18     For a useful discussion see Bernard Boëne, “How Unique Should the Military Be? A Review
of Representative Literature and Outline of a Synthetic Formulation,” European Journal of Sociology
31, no. 1 (1990): 3–59.
19     Dandeker, “Military and Society.”
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armed services, which are normally critical factors in sustaining their identity, sense of shared purpose and morale.20

The conceptualization of the relations between functional and
societal imperatives in zero-sum terms is misleading as it assumes that
military adjustments to civilian values necessarily undermine military
effectiveness, and that the focus on military effectiveness must certainly
mean decreased civilian control or military nonadherence to the values
of civil society.21 The aim should, therefore, not be striking a balance
between the imperatives, but seeking synergies between the imperatives.
One such example is provided by Morris Janowitz, who sought military
professionalism and effectiveness, as well as civilian control, through the
integration of military and political leaderships, and the development of
officers who are aware of the military’s political and social impact.22
The integration of women in combat roles does not respond to the
conventional interpretation of the functional imperative. Not many
military analysts study contemporary warfare and draw the conclusion
that it has changed to an extent that requires the inclusion of women in
combat roles to perform effectively. It should, nonetheless, be noted that
the development of Female Engagement Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan
is the result of such a “needs-based” analysis. Normally, however, ending
the exclusion of women in direct ground combat units is seen as a politically imposed “societal imperative.” If seen through such a perspective,
the integration of women in the armed forces can at best be achieved
without ruining the existing, rather well-adapted military structure
and culture. At worst it can ruin the very core of the military organization—its warrior ideal. It can weaken military fighting power and lose
us the next war, or at least threaten the safety of fellow soldiers. Fear and
rejection is perfectly understandable, albeit based on a flawed assumption about the functional imperative as a completely objective “given,”
provided by professional military analysis. Instead, what constitutes the
functional imperative should be seen as the outcome of a much more
toxic brew of tradition, organizational culture, interservice negotiations,
or what can be described as highly politicized processes of bureaucracies
with limited analytical repertoires, selfish bureaucratic ambitions, and
standard operating procedures.23

The Potential Positive Impact of Women on Fighting Power

The question, then, is how to marry the aims of military conduct and
effectiveness with a gender perspective within the military organization
and female soldiers. Too often, a gender perspective and traditional military values are seen as opposites between which an acceptable balance
must be found. While one should be careful about assigning special
capabilities to female soldiers and officers, this article argues that adding
women to combat units, and a gender perspective to military operations

20     Ibid.
21     Ibid.
22      Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free
Press, 1960), 420.
23      This point is obviously inspired by the work of Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence
of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Little Brown and Co, 1971).
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more generally, have the potential to add new capabilities and improve
the effectiveness of operations.24
Women can play a role with regard to the means, the material factor.
Including the large numbers of women who are physically fit for military
service in the armed forces allows societies to maximize the size of
those forces. The emphasis on “lean and mean” organizations rather
than mass in 21st century warfare indicates the potential contribution
lies in how and with what conviction armed forces conduct operations.
Women can provide specific competencies and perspectives that
improve the conduct of operations. Women in combat units, as well as
implementing a gender perspective in the area of operations, clearly have
the potential to increase the information gathering and analysis capabilities of units. Gaining access to local women not only allows a unit
to develop a better understanding of local conditions and culture but
improves the unit’s relationship with the community and the perceived
legitimacy and force protection of troops. The most obvious examples
are Female or Mixed Engagement Teams, intelligence officers, cultural
analysts, and interpreters who provide access to populations and areas
all-male units cannot engage or search. Another example is provided by
the difficulty in achieving civil-military coordination and cooperation
in campaigns involving a broad set of actors. Male dominance of the
military has been pointed to as one of the cultural features that create
friction between military and humanitarian organizations.25 Female
liaison officers could potentially build bridges between organizations.
Clearly, however, the impact is limited and should not be seen as a silver
bullet. Moreover, without first changing the mindset of commanders
and planners, the importance of women’s perspectives, information, and
analyses is likely to be undervalued within a more traditional narrative.
The impact is, therefore, likely to be limited until a more general mainstreaming of a gender perspective on operations is achieved.
The UN rightly highlights female soldiers as absolutely essential
for certain tasks in peace operations. As an example, they help address
specific needs of female combatants during the process of demobilization and reintegration into civilian life. They can interview survivors
of gender-based violence, mentor female cadets at police and military
academies, and, as highlighted above, interact with women in societies
where women are prohibited from speaking to men.26 Moreover, female
soldiers can serve as role models in the local environment by inspiring
women and girls in often male-dominated societies to push for their
own rights and participate in peace processes. While these competencies
may be dismissed as unrelated to a traditional view of military fighting
power, they may prove essential in what is the most common task of military organizations in the contemporary context—stability operations.
The more important and far-reaching consequence of adding
women to combat units and implementing a gender perspective on
24     For a useful discussion on the positive impact of women and gender perspectives see Sahana
Dharmapuri, “Just add Women and Stir,” Parameters 41, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 56-70.
25      Donna Winslow, “Strange Bedfellows in Humanitarian Crisis: NGOs and the Military,”
in Twisting Arms and Flexing Muscles: Humanitarian Intervention and Peacebuilding in Perspective, eds. N.
Mychajlyszyn, and T. D. Shaw (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2005), 116.
26     United Nations, “Women in Peacekeeping“ (undated), http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
issues/women/womeninpk.shtml.
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operations lies in their transformative potential. It could change the
culture of combat units, the fabric of unit cohesion, and the way combat
and violence is employed in military organizations. This is precisely what
those who resent women in the military fear. If the starting-point is
changed, however, from the idea of a perfect existing order to one that
is problematic and needs improvement for operational effectiveness in
the contemporary strategic context, then including women and gender
perspectives provides a golden opportunity to change the way soldiers
and officers are recruited, trained, and deployed for combat and stability operations. The complexity of contemporary operations means that
soldiers and officers at all levels need good cognitive skills, problemsolving abilities, and a flexible mindset that can respond to a variety of
challenges within a short time frame. The immature, ultra-masculine,
and extremely aggressive character of the ideal warrior mindset has not
done the armed forces any favors in Iraq and Afghanistan. The addition
of women—and preferably in substantial numbers—may well provide
a more mature and balanced unit culture. Women are not necessarily
required for such adaptation, but they may help.

Conclusion

Rather than assuming the existing structure and culture of the armed
forces are well adapted to perform in contemporary military campaigns,
this article highlights what General Sir Rupert Smith called “the endemic
flaws in the current approach.”27 The failures in Iraq and Afghanistan
were not simply the consequences of flawed policies or strategic thinking,
but also the nature of the military instrument at the disposal of political
leadership and the conduct of its operations. The culture and structure
of military organizations, their policies of recruitment, training, education, materiel procurement, doctrine writing, and deployments, all need
to be carefully studied and potentially reconsidered. This involves the
traditional “truths” about the nature of unit cohesion and the optimal
capabilities of individual soldiers and officers. The issue of women in
combat should not be approached through the lens of damage control,
but rather with an emphasis on maximizing the effectiveness of military
organizations in the contemporary strategic context.

27     Smith, The Utility of Force, 307.

